Abstract: We analyze how tariff design incentivizes households to invest in residential photovoltaic and battery systems, and explore selected power sector effects. To this end,
Introduction
Decarbonizing energy supply leads to a substantial transformation of the power sector. In many countries, increasing shares of renewable electricity are generated by small-scale distributed solar photovoltaic (PV) plants (IEA, 2018) . Driven by regulation and dedicated support schemes, private households account for a substantial share of PV installations. In particular, partial self-supply with PV becomes more attractive.
Households' self-generation shares can further increase by the advent of PV-plus-battery systems. Batteries have recently experienced a substantial drop in costs; a trend that is expected to continue in the future (Schmidt et al., 2017) . In this respect, the term prosumage emerged to describe the activity of a household that generates its own PV electricity, enhanced by battery storage, while still being connected to the grid (von Hirschhausen, 2017) .
We investigate how the design of retail and feed-in tariffs (FIT) affects household decisions to invest in PV and battery storage systems. We also explore impacts on the power sector in terms of renewable energy capacities, peak PV feed-in, and the contribution of households to non-energy power system costs, that is, costs for renewable support schemes or the electricity grid infrastructure. To this end, we first provide the intuition how household incentives are shaped by retail tariffs, feed-in tariffs, and respective investment cost for PV and batteries. In a second step, we numerically explore these incentives and their effects in a computational equilibrium model applied to a German 2030 setting. In doing so, we take interactions between households' decisions and the wholesale power market into account.
Central results show that lower feed-in tariffs substantially reduce PV investments. Yet effects on battery capacity and PV self-generation are less pronounced. Higher fixed parts and lower volumetric components in retail tariffs lead to lower optimal battery capacities and self-generation. In turn, households contribute more to non-energy system costs. We further find that limiting peak feed-in, which can relief distribution grids, is possible without substantially distorting households' incentives.
While previous research features a number of analyses on the economic viability of prosumage for specific households, only few contributions consider feedback of prosumage on the power sector. Yet these are largely silent on household behavior and the impact of the regulatory setting. Combining the household, power sector, and regulatory policy perspectives, this paper aims to fill a gap in the literature. It contributes to the academic and policy debates on retail tariff design, increasing deployment of decentral PV and storage systems, and contribution to non-energy power sector costs.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature on prosumage.
Section 3 introduces a conceptual framework and provides some intuition. Based on this, we develop a formal equilibrium model in section 4. Section 5 presents the numerical results; section 6 discusses limitations of our approach and outlines avenues for future research. Section 7 concludes.
(2014) were among the first to argue that falling battery costs will spur the prosumage segment. Kaschub et al. (2016) come to a similar conclusion: according to their analysis, prosumage will be economical for households in the short run even in the absence of subsidies, driven by self-consumption. Using selfgenerated electricity for electric vehicles would support this trend. Dietrich and Weber (2018) also conclude on the profitability of PV-plus-battery systems in the near future, and highlight that economies of scale would incentivize larger installations. A comparative study for Germany and Ireland derives analogous results (Bertsch et al., 2017) . Studies on the viability of residential prosumage also exist for electricity markets in other countries like Australia (Muenzel et al., 2015; Say et al., 2018) , Brazil (Vilaça Gomes et al., 2018) , France (Yu, 2018) , Italy (Cucchiella et al., 2016) , Spain (Prol and Steininger, 2017; Solano et al., 2018) , the United Kingdom (Green and Staffell, 2017) , and the United States (Khalilpour and Vassallo, 2015; Say et al., 2018; Tervo et al., 2018) .
Second, concerning the power sector perspective, prosumage contrasts with the traditional supply-and demand-side division. A widespread adoption of residential PV-plus-battery systems affects both prosumage households and other electricity consumers as well as power generators. This could have broad technical, socio-economic, and political repercussions, as discussed by Agnew and Dargusch (2015) , Schill et al. (2017) , and . More specifically, residential PV-plus-battery systems provide lowcarbon energy and can thus help to achieve climate targets. However, depending on prosumagers' price signals and objectives, economic inefficiencies may arise. These relate to sub-optimal investment in the long run, for instance redundant storage infrastructure, and sub-optimal dispatch in the short run, for instance a modest contribution to system peak shaving or valley filling (Green and Staffell, 2017; Schill et al., 2017) .
Besides investments and dispatch, Marwitz and Elsland (2018) , Moshövel et al. (2015) , and Neetzow et al. (2019) discuss whether and under which regulatory circumstances prosumage may require expanding the electricity distribution grid infrastructure. In contrast, Young et al. (2019) conclude for an Australian region that benefits from reduced peak grid demand may outweigh foregone revenues from self-consumption for network operators.
Third, concerning the regulatory policy perspective, an increasing number of studies addresses the question how to price prosumagers' consumption and generation. Proposed policies can be broadly divided into a revision of retail rate structures, remuneration schemes for decentral generation, and other policy measures. Hemphill, 2014; Laws et al., 2017) : ever fewer customers must pay ever higher grid charges which, in turn, incentivizes further load defection. However, given that this would require major uptake of residential PV-plus-battery systems, such scenario is rather unlikely to occur in many developed countries' power sectors (Darghouth et al., 2016; Laws et al., 2017) .
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In conclusion, the literature features individual analyses that provide an in-depth treatment of specific households, yet mostly do not take interactions between prosumagers and the power sector into account.
Power sector studies mostly neither incorporate prosumage households' incentives nor the tariff design.
Regulatory studies generally lack a numerical underpinning. We aim to contribute to all three perspectives and provide an analysis of tariff design for prosumage, which also includes PV and storage investment incentives of households. While we focus on the German context, results are of interest also for other markets where feed-in tariffs and high volumetric retail tariffs drive solar prosumage.
Residential prosumage: definitions and intuition

Definitions
We define a residential prosumager as a grid-connected household with a PV panel and a battery (Schill et al., 2017) . Figure 1 presents a stylized representation. The household generates electricity (G P V ) that it consumes at times (G pro2pro ), feeds into the grid at other times (G pro2m ), potentially curtails (CU pro ), or stores in the battery (ST O in,pro ) for future consumption (ST O out,pro ). Still, the household may consume electricity from the grid, i.e. the market, at any point in time (E m2pro ). For clarity, we assume that the battery can only be used for deferring self-consumption.
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There are two standard metrics that describe the dependency of prosumage households on power provision from the grid: the rate of self-consumption and the autarky rate (Luthander et al., 2015; Weniger et al., 2014) . The rate of self-consumption SC is the fraction of electricity generated on-site that is either directly consumed or stored in the battery for future self-consumption.
The lower the rate of self-consumption SC, the higher the revenues generated from feeding energy into the grid. For example, a self-consumption rate of 40% implies that 60% of the generated electricity receive a remuneration, for example the feed-in tariff. This explains why relying solely on levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) to determine the profitability of a PV-plus-battery system for a single household is inadequate.
1 A related debate discusses the metering design in case of residential photovoltaic (plus battery) systems. Specifically, under net metering consumers' PV electricity grid feed-in and and grid-consumption are offset against each other over a longer time horizon (Hughes and Bell, 2006) . This was shown to substantially raise incentives for residential standalone PV investments in different settings (e.g., Darghouth et al., 2016; Eid et al., 2014; Picciariello et al., 2015) , fuelling discussions on distributional justice. 2 In principle, other uses are conceivable like smoothing grid consumption and feed-in or providing flexibility by storing in and out grid electricity. Schill et al. (2017) show that such additional battery use can lower total power system costs.
The autarky rate A, also referred to as rate of self-generation or rate of self-sufficiency, is the share of household electricity demand covered by generation from the PV-plus-battery system. This includes directly consumed energy and energy discharged from the battery storage.
The higher a household's the autarky rate A, the less it pays for energy consumed from the grid. Both the autarky and self-consumption rates are defined over a specified time interval, usually a year. 
Intuition: Incentives for prosumage
For a rational household, economic incentives for prosumage are largely driven by investment costs for PV and storage systems as well as grid consumption and feed-in tariffs.
3 Under the current German setting, households face time-invariant, volumetric rates for grid consumption and PV grid feed-in, the retail tariff and the feed-in tariff, respectively. In 2008, the average German residential retail tariff for electricity was 0.21 EUR/kWh. A decade later, in 2018, it had increased to about 0.30 EUR/kWh, of which 0.23 EUR/kWh accrued for non-energy components like taxes, network charges and renewable support payments; a share of 80%. Importantly, self-consumption from small-scale PV systems below 10 kW is exempt from any such cost components. At the same time, the cost degression of PV systems has led to a substantial reduction of feed-in tariffs, which have decreased from more than 0.46 EUR/kWh in 2008 to less than 0.12 EUR/kWh in 2018. Figure 2 illustrates these developments over the last decade. In principle, if the retail tariff exceeds the FIT, self-consumption of PV electricity becomes economical. Yet this socket parity (Bazilian et al., 2013) does not necessarily imply economic viability of prosumage because residential demand and PV supply may only partly coincide in time. Savings from further substituting grid consumption with self-consumption must over-compensate the necessary investments into a battery.
To this end, figure 3 provides a more comprehensive illustration of incentives for investments in residential PV and battery systems. It extends an analysis by Ossenbrink (2017) by adding the storage dimension.
In the following, we go through the figure's areas A to F , using the German situation as an example. The lower left area A refers to a situation where the LCOE of a decentral PV installation exceed both the retail and feed-in tariffs. Hence, there is no financial incentive for households to invest in PV or battery systems ("Pure consumer"). This was the situation in Germany before a FIT was introduced in the year 2000.
The 45-degree line starting at the upper right corner of area A marks the points where the FIT and retail price are equal. In the upper left area B, the FIT exceeds the levelized costs of PV, and the FIT is also higher than the retail tariff. This characterizes the market situation in Germany before 2012. Households have an incentive to feed all generated PV electricity into the grid and satisfy their demand with grid consumption. 4 This means they are full grid producers and consumers. Moreover, since the PV system can generate positive revenues, households are incentivized to invest in a PV system that is as large as
possible. Yet there is no incentive to install battery storage since it is more attractive to generate revenues from the FIT than to avoid consuming from the grid.
When the retail tariff exceeds both the LCOE of PV and the FIT, self-consumption becomes attractive ("Prosumer" areas C and D). Consider area C first. The FIT exceeds the levelized costs for PV and creates an incentive to install the maximum PV capacity. At the same time, the retail tariff is higher than the FIT, meaning that it is attractive to substitute as much grid consumption as possible with on-site generation. In area D, the FIT is not high enough to cover the LCOE of PV. In this situation, households no longer have an incentive to install the maximum possible PV capacity. The optimal PV capacity trades off the costs for the PV system with the revenues collected through the FIT and the expenditure on grid consumption saved through self-consumption. In both areas E and F , installing a battery storage is more profitable than a PV-stand-alone system. For this to be the case, the retail tariff must not only be high relative to the LCOE of PV, but also relative to the FIT. Since the battery is used to offset grid consumption with self-generated PV energy, which would otherwise be fed to the grid, the difference between the two tariffs must cover the levelized costs of storage (LCOS). The higher the storage costs, the further areas E and F are shifted to the right. Similarly, battery capacity deployed by households increases with this difference since it increases incentives for offsetting grid consumption. As before, these two prosumage situations differ with respect to the deployed PV capacity.
If the FIT is above the LCOE of PV, in area F , households deploy the maximum PV capacity, while the optimal PV size is smaller in E. Households are incentivized to maximize their self-consumption in both 4 Model, data, and scenarios
In the following, we illustrate the incentive structure by means of a numerical model applied to German 2030 scenarios. Beyond prosumage household decisions, we investigate selected effects on the power sector.
Model
The model features a prosumage household agent and a benevolent power sector operator. For each constraint, the respective Lagrange multiplier, or shadow price, is given in parentheses.
The hourly available PV energy depends on the exogenous capacity factor φ avail pv,h ∈ [0, 1] and the installed capacity. It can be consumed by the household, sold to the market, curtailed CU
The stored energy at the end of each hour ST O l,pro h is equal to the storage level at the end of the previous period, minus the energy discharged in the current period, plus the charged energy, corrected by the battery's roundtrip efficiency η (2d). In the first period, the household starts with an empty storage (2e).
Battery use is subject to the installed power and energy capacities (2f-2h).
The maximum PV capacity per household is limited to mpv to reflect space restrictions or regulatory thresholds (2i). Appendix A.2.2 gives a full account of the Lagrangian and according KKT first-order optimality conditions.
The second agent is a benevolent power sector operator. She minimizes total system costs through optimal dispatch of a given power plant and pumped-hydro storage fleet. This dispatch is equivalent to a competitive market outcome. The market clears in every hour, meaning that total generation must equal total consumption. This includes both the grid demand from the prosumage household and a non-prosumage inelastic demand representing all other consumers. The according dual variable λ In order to analyze prosumage households and generators jointly in an equilibrium problem, we combine the KKT conditions of the two programs in a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) (Facchinei and Pang, 2007) . Figure 
Data
The size of the prosumage segment is set to one million households, in accordance with prosumage growth projections for Germany (BNetzA, 2018b) . This number represents approximately ten percent of all singlefamily and two-family houses that are potentially suitable for PV-plus-battery systems (Prognos, 2016) .
That is, the prosumage agent represents the aggregate of all prosumage households. In line with the current threshold for being exempt from paying the renewable surcharge on self-consumed electricity, we set an upper PV investment limit of 10 kW per household. The annual load of each prosumage household is assumed to be 5 MWh, the average value of a German single-family household (Destatis, 2018). (2014)). The expected LCOE of smallscale PV for a household range between 0.07 and 0.08 EUR/kWh, including expenses for value-added tax (VAT). The assumed storage costs imply a substantial reduction compared to current levels in Germany.
Though this projection is optimistic regarding storage cost decline, it lies within the expected range for 2030 reported by Schmidt et al. (2017) .
Demand of prosumage households follows the standard load profile of the German Association of Energy and Water Industries (BDEW, 2015) and is scaled up to represent one million households. The hourly PV capacity factor is a capacity-normalized, country-aggregated time series taken from and . These sources are based on reanalysis data of the year 2012, which constitutes an average weather year. (2013) and Pape et al. (2014) . Table 6 in appendix A.2.4 lists the complete cost parameters for the power sector dispatch.
The German load profile for pure consumers follows the Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2030 of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSOE, 2018) . This projection of future demand is supposed to be representative of a normal weather year. We subtract the demand of the prosumage segment from the national demand curve. As for renewable energy sources, hourly capacity factors are taken from and . 
Scenarios
We devise a number of scenarios of the year 2030 that differ with respect to which price signals prosumage households receive (table 2) . Some scenarios also include other, non-price-based policies. The first group of scenarios keep the volumetric tariff price constant and vary the level of the feed-in tariff. Scenario Retail_30 F IT _0 represents an extreme case in which grid feed-in of PV electricity by households is prohibited. Scenario Retail_30 F IT _8 Cap is the same as the baseline, but additionally restricts the hourly maximum in-feed of prosumage PV energy into the grid to 50% of the installed PV capacity. This is in line with the requirements for preferential loans in Germany by 2019.
The second group of scenarios implement a greater fixed part for retail tariffs. Households pay an annual fixed fee t f ix and, in turn, a lower volumetric charge t other for non-energy price components. This reflects a more capacity-oriented tariff design. For a pure consumer household with an annual load of 5 MWh, all scenarios with a fixed-part retail tariff result in the same annual bill of 1500 EUR as under the baseline and volumetric scenarios.
The third group of scenarios represent dynamic pricing schemes. Households pay a volumetric retail tariff of 0.30 EUR/kWh in scenario Retail_30 F IT _RT P and sell their electricity at the current wholesale The other two dynamic pricing scenarios impose a real-time price on both the retail and the feed-in sides,
with an additional market premium of 0.03 EUR/kWh in scenario Retail_RT P F IT _RT P + 3. This is motivated by the idea that the mean market value of PV energy is typically low in hours with high PV feed-in. The market premium may help to cover the cost difference between LCOE of PV and the wholesale market price.
Results
We show and interpret the model results with respect to household investments, how households use their prosumage systems, and several implications for the power sector. In doing so, we relate our findings to the prosumage incentives that households receive through price signals, as illustrated in figure 3.
Optimal household investments into PV and storage
In the baseline scenario Retail_30 F IT _8, prosumage households install a PV capacity of 10 kW, storage energy capacity of 5.7 kW h, and storage power capacity of 1.2 kW (figure 6). The FIT is above the levelized cost of PV and grid feed-in never constitutes a net loss. The storage helps to substitute grid energy, priced at the volumetric retail tariff, by self-generated energy, at the levelized cost of PV and storage. Consequently, prosumage is profitable, and the baseline scenario refers to area F in figure 3.
Panel 6a shows the results for the first group of scenarios. At a volumetric retail tariff of 0.30 EUR/kWh, a FIT below the LCOE of PV of 0.08 EUR/kWh yields lower optimal PV investments, referring to area E in figure 3. Yet optimal battery energy capacities are relatively stable because the storage is built to optimize the amount of self-consumed PV generation given the retail price. Beyond a storage capacity of 5 to 6 kWh, the costs of additional storage become too high compared to the small increase in selfconsumption and avoidance of grid consumption that can be reached. This finding also holds true in the absence of remuneration for grid feed-in. A feed-in cap yields somewhat higher optimal storage capacities to accommodate a greater share of self-consumption. Eventually, the difference between the volumetric retail tariff and FIT is too small to profitably cover expenditure on the storage battery. Consequently, scenarios Retail_15 F IT _8 and Retail_15 F IT _0 refer to areas C and D in figure 3, respectively.
If PV feed-in is remunerated by the real-time price, optimal PV capacities are below the maximum, at around 5.5 kW per household (panel 6c). In fact, the average price for which households sell electricity to the market is slightly above 0.04 EUR/kWh, rendering results comparable to scenario Retail_30 F IT _4.
A FIT of 0.05 EUR/kWh, or a market premium of 0.03 EUR/kWh, thus, yield greater optimal PV investments. Average real-time retail prices at which households buy electricity from the market are slightly below 0.05 EUR/kWh. With the volumetric component of 0.25 EUR/kWh, the eventual retail rate is around 0.30 EUR/kWh. Accordingly, optimal storage energy investments are comparable to the first group of scenarios and range between 5 and 6 kWh.
Optimal household dispatch: self-generation, self-consumption, and expenditure
We start with some intuition. Figure 7 shows the dispatch behavior of a prosumage household for three sunny days at the end of April, taken from the baseline scenario. During the day, the available solar energy exceeds the demand of the prosumage household, and it can consume only a part of PV energy directly. Most of the PV energy is sent to the grid, peaking in hours of high solar radiation. Prosumage households charge their battery fully in the morning and discharge it in the evening when available PV energy declines. Both the feed-in and retail tariffs are time-invariant. Therefore, the household is not incentivized to schedule grid feed-in to hours with higher prices, for instance in the morning, and grid demand to hours with lower prices, for instance at night. Around 30% (1.6 MWh) of demand is met with energy from the battery, while only one fifth is obtained from the grid (panel 8a). The overall PV generation of 10.9 MWh exceeds annual demand, yielding a self-consumption rate slightly below 40%. More than half of the PV generated electricity is sent to the grid. This does not change much if the baseline setting is combined with a cap on maximum PV feed-in.
For a lower FIT, the composition of sources that satisfy electricity demand stays relatively stable -the autarky rate is between 64% and 78% -with a somewhat increasing share of grid electricity (panel 8a).
Likewise, the absolute volumes of self-consumption, direct or facilitated by the battery, only decrease
slightly. Yet optimal PV panels are smaller and generate overall less electricity, yielding a higher relative proportion of self-consumption. If grid feed-in is prohibited, households consume 80% of their PV electricity themselves, with the remaining energy curtailed. For greater fixed parts in retail tariffs, and accordingly lower volumetric parts, panel 8b shows a stronger dependency on the grid. In this group of scenarios, it is less attractive to substitute grid energy with selfgenerated energy. For illustration, compare the baseline Retail_30 F IT _8 with scenario Retail_15 F IT _8.
With a halved volumetric retail price, a prosumage household satisfies 2.6 MWh of her annual electricity demand from the grid, compared to only 1.0 MWh in the baseline. Accordingly, the autarky rate drops from 80% to below 50%. In the most extreme scenario Retail_15 F IT _0, prosumage households satisfy only 30% (1.5 MWh) of their demand on-site and source approximately 70% (3.5 MWh) from the grid.
Lower volumetric retail tariffs also decrease the volume of self-consumed energy. In the baseline, 4.1 MWh out of 10.9 MWh PV generation are consumed on-site, that is, around 38%. In scenario Retail_15 F IT _8, only 2.4 MWh are consumed on-site, amounting to about 22%, and 8.5 MWh are fed into the grid. Batteryfacilitated self-consumption does not take place.
Results for real-time pricing, with a mean price of around 0.05 EUR/kWh for energy consumption plus a Tariff design also affects the electricity bill of prosumage households (figure 9). Prosumage households profit the most in scenarios where they offset large parts of their grid consumption. In the baseline Retail_30 F IT _8, their annual bill on electricity expenditure is 785 EUR (panel 9a). It includes annualized costs of the PV and storage systems, expenses for grid consumption, and revenues from PV power feed-in. Compared to a pure consumer, the bill almost halves. If the FIT is lower, total net expenditures rise slightly, with a pronounced shift toward expenses for grid consumption. If grid feed-in is capped at 50% of the installed PV capacity, household expenditures are largely the same as under the baseline. This means that households can effectively adjust their energy feed-in without incurring curtailment losses. Lower volumetric retail tariffs with higher fixed parts influence expenditures of prosumage households to a greater extent (panel 9b). Since they must pay a fixed network charge in any case, the saving potential of prosumage compared to pure consumer behavior deteriorates. In any of the scenarios, non-energy payments for grid consumption constitute a substantial part of household expenditure.
The real-time pricing scenarios (panel 9c) only have moderate effects on the electricity bill when compared to the baseline. Prosumage households can still reduce their annual expenditure below 1000 EUR, representing a cut of more than a third over pure consumers. Differences between the real-time pricing scenarios are rather small because the assumed inelastic demand limits households' options to respond to price signals on the consumption side.
Selected effects on the power sector
Beyond households, the prosumage tariffs implemented in the different scenarios also affect the power sector. We discuss implications for peak feed-in, PV generation, and recovery of non-energy costs.
Peak feed-in
While we do not model the electricity distribution grid explicitly and idiosyncratic configurations prevent general conclusions, peak demand and peak feed-in are suitable indicators: higher peaks incur higher stress. The left-hand sides of all panels in figure 10 indicate that none of the pricing schemes helps reducing peak residual demand. In all scenarios, it is around 1.3 kW. Thus, prosumage households do not shift their consumption patterns in a way that alleviates potential stress on the distribution grid. The right-hand sides of the residual load duration curves show the feed-in peaks. The peak is the higher the larger the PV capacity. In the baseline, it amounts to 6.3 kW; a similar order of magnitude emerges in the other scenarios with maximum PV investment. With 3.5 kW, it is about half this size if maximum feed-in is capped at 50%. Note that this reduction is reached with only little financial disadvantage for prosumage households.
In the scenarios with real-time pricing on the generation side (panel 10c), the maximum feed-in is also somewhat lower, around 2 kW, compared to the baseline. Beyond the smaller PV size, this is also driven by low market prices in hours with high solar radiation. Thus, households have an incentive to avoid those hours for feeding into the grid. Comparing scenarios Retail_30 F IT _4 and Retail_30 F IT _RT P illustrates this point. While PV and storage capacities are about the same size, the maximum feed-in is 1 kW higher for the time-invariant FIT. A similar rationale applies to the market premium scenario compared to the fixed FIT scenarios. Also here, maximum feed-in is lower by about 1 kW at similar capacities.
Contribution to PV expansion and non-energy power system costs
Finally, we provide results how prosumage tariffs can impact the expansion of PV capacities on the one hand and recovery of non-energy costs of the power sector on the other. These non-energy system costs may account for grid costs, surcharges for financing renewables, and other fees. To this end, we quantify a prosumage household's contribution by summing up expenses on the volumetric and fixed charges t other and t f ix . We contrast this figure with households' PV investments. Figure 11 shows the power sector non-energy cost contribution on the horizontal axis. PV capacity, as contribution to providing renewable energy, are on the vertical axis. The further to the north-east, the better a scenario addresses both dimensions.
In the baseline scenario, prosumage households have an autarky rate of 80% and contribute to non-energy power sector costs with about 245 EUR/year (panel 11a). For a pure consumer, this number amounts to 1250 EUR/year. Thus, the baseline tariff scheme may hamper cost recovery of energy infrastructures.
It incentivizes households to lower grid consumption and save on the retail tariff with the according volumetric surcharges. Also in the other scenarios with dominant volumetric retail pricing, prosumage households contribute modestly to non-energy power system costs. In general, the higher the autarky rate and the less a household pays for volumetric price components, the less it contributes. Concerning the contribution to expanding renewable energy, the baseline features maximum PV investments of 10 kW.
As discussed, lower FITs lead to lower PV investments and, thus, a lower contribution to expanding renewables.
In contrast, if households face a fixed part in their retail tariff independent of their annual consumption level, as in the second group of scenarios, greater autarky does not necessarily go along with a lower contribution to non-energy power sector costs (panel 11b). The fixed payments allow households to save on volumetric retail expenses for energy, yet make sure that they contribute to non-energy system costs. As in all scenarios, a FIT above the LCOE of PV triggers maximum investments. Thus, these tariff designs appear most suitable to involve prosumage households in the recovery of fixed power system costs and incentivize large PV capacities. Results for the real-time pricing scenarios (panel 11c) do not differ much from the scenarios with a purely volumetric retail tariff. 
Panel a
Discussion of limitations
Our analysis is subject to several limitations. First, the model does not endogenously capture all power sector costs related to prosumage. We can only give an indication whether a certain tariff setting may be detrimental to distribution (or transmission) grids; a deeper analysis would require explicitly modeling the underlying power flows. We also take on a static perspective. We set non-energy cost component of retail tariffs exogenously and abstract from their potential adaption over time. Hence, concerning utilities, the death spiral effect is not explicitly accounted for. Concerning households, this hampers the analysis of rebound effects. Thus, determining an optimal tariff design is eventually not possible, and not aimed for, within the chosen modeling framework.
Second, we apply several simplifications to the power sector dispatch problem. The model abstracts from inter-temporal dispatch restrictions like ramping constraints or minimum up and down times of thermal generators. This tends to overestimate the flexibility of conventional generators. Beyond pumped-hydro storage, we abstract from further flexibility options in the power sector level like flexible sector coupling.
Together with our focus on Germany only, this tends to under-estimate flexibility and, accordingly, overestimate price volatility in the dynamic pricing scenarios.
Third, we apply several simplifications to the household side. Model-wise, we abstract from the influence of uncertainty. However, we expect this to have little impact on results. It is plausible that necessary information on demand, solar radiation, and wholesale market prices is readily available from smart forecasting tools, and prosumage scheduling is close to optimal in shorter time frames. Data-wise, the standard load profile and national PV capacity factors are likely smoother than actual households' profiles. This tends to overestimate the match between household demand and PV generation, yielding higher autarky and self-consumption rates than observed in reality (Weniger et al., 2014) . On a behavioral note, imperfect information or transaction costs may drive away household decisions from optimal values identified in our research. However, it is reasonable to assume households do, on average, choose a system according to their consumption needs and market incentives. When addressing these limitations, we expect our findings to be preserved, though potentially less pronounced than suggested by the model. Most importantly, we abstract from heterogeneous households. Therefore, we cannot explicitly derive distributional implications between different prosuming households as well as prosuming and non-prosuming households.
Last, cost assumptions for residential PV and storage batteries are important input parameters. If storage costs decline to a lesser extent than assumed or if interest rates increase, substituting grid energy with selfgenerated power will be less profitable. However, given the already high retail price in Germany, storage will still become profitable even if investment costs are considerably higher than in the model scenarios.
As a consequence, optimal storage capacity would be smaller, but general findings would still apply since all scenario results would be affected in a fairly similar manner.
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Possible directions for future research could address these limitations. Specifically, a more detailed, endogenous representation of retail and network tariffs would enable a dynamic perspective on tariff formation and cross-subsidies between consumers and prosumage households. Moreover, future research could analyze the effects of different tariff designs when including demand-side management, heat pumps, and electric vehicles on the household side. It is likely that this additional flexibility and increased demand will intensify the observed differences between scenarios.
Conclusions
Solar prosumage is still a niche phenomenon in most power markets as of 2019. However, as storage costs further decline and self-consumption of electricity becomes increasingly attractive, solar prosumage has the potential to unfold disruptive effects on the power sector. Whether it is attractive for households to invest in batteries and increase their level of PV self-generation vitally depends on the design of retail and feed-in tariffs.
Our model-based analysis for German 2030 scenarios shows that prosumage becomes profitable in many settings, even in absence of purchasing subsidies for batteries or a FIT for PV energy. Given established cost projections for PV and battery storage and a high volumetric retail price, households face strong incentives to substitute large parts of their grid energy consumption with self-generated energy. Departing 12 In a not reported sensitivity with double storage costs, prosumage households invest in a storage energy capacity of 4 kWh and a PV capacity of 10 kW. Only if we calibrate storage costs in line with the most conservative cost decrease prediction of Schmidt et al. (2017) , self-consumption without batteries will be more profitable than prosumage in the model scenarios. Model results are less sensitive regarding the costs of PV systems.
from the current electricity tariff design, and introducing a greater fixed tariff part for households, would deteriorate incentives to invest in storage systems.
At high feed-in tariffs, households invest in large PV capacities, reach considerable shares of self-generation, and feed a good amount of surplus PV energy into the grid. In contrast, households opt for smaller PV capacities at low feed-in remunerations, since they then face a trade-off regarding the optimal PV system size. Yet the optimal storage capacity for a prosumage household is less sensitive to the feed-in tariff schemes. This is because the storage capacity is driven by the time profiles of residual residential electricity demand and PV generation: beyond a certain storage capacity, the costs of increasing selfgeneration through additional storage become prohibitive.
From an energy (transition) policy perspective, prosumage is not desirable or detrimental as such. Potentially unintended consequences can arise if high volumetric retail and FIT pricing schemes prevail. High volumetric retail tariffs give prosumage households the incentive to reach high levels of autarky. While these households save costs through self-generation, they contribute less to the national total of grid expenses, renewable surcharges or taxes. Especially concerning grid costs, such revenue shortfalls eventually must be covered by other, non-privileged electricity consumers, giving rise to distributional issues. This is aggravated by the conjuncture that prosumage households could induce distribution grid overloads because of peak PV feed-in and thus over-proportionately contribute to network instability and costs.
While a high feed-in tariff increases the renewable energy capacity provided by the residential sector, it does not convey incentives for energy-market-oriented dispatch of PV-plus-battery systems. Real-time pricing could incentivize prosumage households to better align their self-consumption patterns with the electricity wholesale market. A maximum feed-in policy, which caps the peak energy fed into the grid, seems to be suitable to achieve distribution grid reliefs, without causing a large financial disadvantage for prosumage households.
Taken together, none of the tariff design options investigated here seem to dominate in the investigated respects. A greater contribution to non-energy power sector costs can generally be achieved with a greater role for fixed non-energy charges. This can be combined with a FIT, and potentially also with a feed-in cap. Given the FIT is high enough, it incentivizes high investments into PV capacity. At the same time, it is relatively easy to implement from an administrative and ICT perspective. Such a combination of FITs and higher fixed retail tariff parts may thus help to foster the transition to renewable energies and, at the same time, to keep up households' contribution to recover non-energy power sector costs.
A.1 Prosumage market situation in Germany
This appendix section provides more details on the market situation for prosumage in Germany. In 2017,
1.6 million PV plants with a total capacity of 43 GW supplied roughly 7% of the national electricity demand (BSW Solar, 2018b) . Small-scale rooftop systems with a capacity of up to 10 kW, which are typical for the residential sector, accounted for a share of 20% of national PV capacity (Fraunhofer ISE, 2019) . Still, self-generation and -consumption of electricity is a niche phenomenon, with only 6% of electricity generated by all PV plants consumed on-site in 2018 on-site in (BMWi, 2018 .
Yet this number is likely to increase with the ongoing dissemination of battery storage. More than 100, 000 so-called "solar battery storage systems" have been installed in Germany until 2018 (BSW Solar, 2018a).
The mean price of lithium-ion storage systems had halved between 2013 and 2017 (Figgener et al., 2018) , and further cost decreases are likely (Schmidt et al., 2017) . Beyond that, the German state-owned development bank ran a so-called market incentive program that subsidized the installation of battery storage connected to small scale PV systems. Also, an increasing number of PV systems will drop out of the feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme after the 20-year supporting period. This will be the case for almost half a million small-scale PV plants by 2030 (OPSD, 2018 Wiese et al., 2019) . A great share of this capacity can be expected to be still operational (Schill et al., 2017) and could be upgraded with a battery storage to engage in prosumage (DIHK, 2018) .
A.2 Model details
This appendix section provides more details on the numerical model.
A.2.1 Technical model details
The following tables collect the sets, variables, and parameters contained in the model formulation. Dual variable on maximum storage discharging in hour h 
A.2.3 Power sector dispatch optimization
The generation side of the power sector is represented by a benevolent system operator who minimizes total system costs Z sys through optimal dispatch. This dispatch is equivalent to a competitive equilibrium outcome and results in dispatching generators and storage based on the short-term variable costs or opportunity costs, respectively. The system costs for power generation comprise the short-term variable costs of conventional generators c m con only, as shown in the objective function A.5a. Renewable generation technologies and storage are assumed to incur no variable operating costs.
.5b shows the energy balance, i.e., the market clearing condition, which must hold in each hour. A.2.4 Power sector data Table 6 compiles numerical assumptions on technologies in the central power sector. 
